Predicting anomalous behaviour of a running process using system call trace is a common practice among security community and it is still an active research area. It is a typical pattern recognition problem and can be dealt with machine learning algorithms. Standard system call datasets were employed to train these algorithms. However, advancements in operating systems made these datasets outdated and un-relevant. Australian Defence Force Academy Linux Dataset (ADFA-LD) and Australian Defence Force Academy Windows Dataset (ADFA-WD) are new generation system calls datasets that contain labelled system call traces for modern exploits and attacks on various applications. In this paper, we evaluate performance of Modified Vector Space Representation technique on ADFA-LD and ADFA-WD datasets using various classification algorithms. Our experimental results show that our method performs well and it helps accurately distinguishing process behaviour through system calls.
Introduction
System call is a request for a service that program makes to the kernel. Sequence of the system calls can describe the behaviour of the process. System call traces are used in Host based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) to distinguish normal and malicious processes. There are a number of data representation techniques found in literature (e.g, n-gram model and lookahead pairs [1] [2], sequencegram [3] , pairgram [4] , etc.) used to extract the features from the system call trace for process behaviour classification.
System Call Trace Representation
In order to classify the process behaviour using system call trace, one needs to extract the features from it. Data representation techniques can be used to convert the system call trace into feature vector. Common data representation techniques used for system call representation are as follows:
Trivial Representation
The basic representation of system call trace is to consider it as a string (sequence) of system calls. Let us consider an operating system with total m number of unique system calls, then set of system calls can be represented by { } 
Boolean Model
Simple representation technique can be found in the area of information retrieval is Boolean Model [18] . It is an exact match model, which can represent a system call trace as a vector having all possible system call number as its index. The value of index is 1 if system call is present in given trace and 0 otherwise.
Consider total number of system calls in an operating system is m. A system call trace i S can be represented using boolean model as a feature vector O N U × . This model considers every system call equally important and only marks its presence or absence. It does not assign any weight to the system call that appears multiple times in a system call trace.
Vector Space Model
Vector Space Model is another common and powerful technique used in information retrieval field to represent document as set of words [18] . It is also known as "bag of words" technique as it assigns weight to each word in the given document in order to determine how much the document is relevant to specific words. Here the weight is assigned to a word as number of times the word appear in the document. In the context of system call representation, system call trace is considered as document and each system call as one word. Then we can apply vector space model to represent given system call trace as a feature vector.
To represent the system call traces using vector space model (bag of words) representation, let us consider a feature set B, as a set of vectors corresponds to applications' system call traces. System call trace for an application i with this model can be represented as, vector 1 2 3 , , , , 
Modified Vector Space Representation
Vector space model cannot preserve the relative order of system calls. e.g. Feature vector for system call traces 1 :  ,  ,  ,  S open read close exit and 2 : , , , S open exit close read are similar. Relative order of system calls is more important in case of modelling process behaviour. Loss of system call sequence information can leave a system vulnerable to mimicry attacks [19] [20] , where a malware writer interleaves malware system call trace patterns with benign system call trace. Thus, we consider the multiple consecutive system calls as one term. Number of system calls in a term is defined by term-size. For term-size l and total number of unique system calls m, n-gram model provide total l m number of possible unique terms in a feature vector. In order to represent the system call traces using this approach, let us consider < . In addition to that, all features (terms) are not present in the system call traces, which means they are having zero weight in feature vector. We can reduce the dimension of feature vector by considering only those unique terms which are present in the data.
If we consider only those unique terms that appear in training data, the memory requirement would be less compared to considering all possible unique terms generated from U. This can be represented by set of all unique terms of length l occurring in training data. The set can be defined as train The feature vector built by considering only those terms that appeared in training data is much compact than other system call representations. However, it requires prior knowledge of unique terms in system call traces, which is not always possible. We can easily find the unique terms from the training data. However, during training, we might not have explored all possible usages of application. It is quite possible that, terms that were not present in the training data may appear in testing data.
Modified Vector Space Representation [16] extends the previous representation (which considers unique terms from training data only) by incorporating mechanism to handle any unforeseen terms during testing. We deliberately add a system call number (we refer it as unknown (unk)) in list, whose value is higher than any system call number present in system call list for OS. We form terms of length l comprising this unknown system call number including one term having all unknown system call number. Let E be the set of unknown terms comprising unk system call number. unk is a number deliberately added in the list of system call numbers to map terms, which are not seen during training but found in testing. Hence, the new feature set can be defined as new 
Here, number of terms comprising of unk system call E will be very small.
Evaluation
In this section we provide details of datasets, classification algorithms selected, evaluation metrics and experiments methodology used for evaluation.
Datasets
We have evaluated modified vector space representation with two datasets namely ADFA-LD (Linux Dataset) and ADFA-WD (Windows Dataset) constructed by G. Creech et al. [10] - [12] . Table 1 describes the number of traces collected from [21] for each category for ADFA-LD and ADFA-WD dataset. For ADFA-LD system call traces for specific process were generated using auditd [22] Unix program, an auditing utility for collecting security relevant events. These traces were then filtered for undersize and oversize limit, which is 300 Bytes to 6 kB for training data and 300 Bytes to 10 kB for validation data [11] [12]. ADFA-LD dataset was collected under Ubuntu 11.04 fully patched operating system with kernel 2.6.38. The operating system was running different services like webserver, database server, SSH server, FTP server etc. ADFA-LD also incorporates system call traces of different types of attacks. ADFA-WD (Windows Dataset) represents the high-quality collection of DLL access requests and system calls for a variety of hacking attacks [11] . Dataset was collected in Windows XP SP2 host with the help of Procmon [23] program. Default firewall was enabled and Norton AV 2013 was installed to filter only sophisticated attacks and ignore the low level attacks. The OS environment enabled file sharing and configured network printer. It was running applications like, webserver, database server, FTP server, streaming media server, PDF reader, etc. Total 12 known vulnerabilities for installed applications were exploited with the help of Metasploit framework and other custom methods. Table 3 describes the details of each attack class in ADFA-WD dataset [11] .
Algorithms Selected for Experiments
We selected Weka workbench [24] [25] for evaluation of modified vector space representation on ADFA-LD and ADFA-WD datasets. Weka hosts number of machine learning algorithms which can be easily applied on our prepared datasets of varying term-size. We selected nine well-known classification algorithms from six different categories given in Weka. The list of selected algorithms, selected options for individual algorithm and their respective category in Weka are shown in Table 4 .
Experiments Methodology
Datasets were collected from [21] and then converted into modified vector space representation for various term-size. For these experiments we selected the term-size 1, 2, 3 and 5. For each dataset (i.e. ADFA-LD and ADFA-WD) we ran experiments for binary class as well as for multiclass label classification. For binary class we considered one of two labels for each trace -normal and attack. For multiclass classification, number of classes and class labels are different for both datasets. In ADFA-LD we have total 7 class labels viz. normal, adduser, hydra-ftp, hydra-ssh, java-meterpreter, meterpreter and webshell. While in ADFA-WD we have total 13 class labels viz. normal and V1 to V12. We ran each chosen algorithms with selected options on converted data in Weka through 10-fold cross-validation method. Table 5 describes the number of features extracted from ADFA-LD and ADFA-WD dataset for varying term-size using modified vector space representation.
Evaluation Metrics
We have used the following common evaluation metrics that are widely used in information retrieval area [18] :
True Positive (TP): Number of attack traces detected as attack traces. Figure 1 shows the confusion matrix, which can be used to derive other measures. Precision: It is the ratio of how many attack traces predicted as attack traces out of total number of traces predicted as attack traces. TP Precision TP FP = + Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC): It is the area covered by ROC curve. It is equivalent to the probability that a classifier will rank a randomly chosen positive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative one [26] . (Tables A1-A4) .
Results and Analysis
From Figure 2 , we can observe that using modified vector space representation all algorithms perform reasonably well. However, IBk and J48 performed best in all experiments.
With IBk algorithm we can notice that as we increase the term-size, its performance starts degrading (i.e. accuracy decreases and FP Rate increases). These changes are clearly visible in case of ADFA-LD dataset. Similar performance results are achieved by J48 in all experiments. However, IBk have higher FP Rate compare to J48 for term-size 3 and 5 on ADFA-LD dataset.
Comparing IBk and J48 with application perspective, J48 requires more time in building the decision tree model during training but it is faster during testing phase. On contrary, IBk does not have any difference between training and testing phase. It finds distance between test instance and all other training instances during testing phase. Due to this IBk seeks high amount of memory space to store all training instances during testing phase compare to J48, whereas storing J48 model is merely a tree to be stored. So, with J48 in testing phase classifying a test instance is as simple as traversing limited number of branches (based on feature values) of a decision tree from root to leaf.
On ADFA-WD dataset, all algorithms perform well for binary class classification, but perform poorly for multiclass classification. Similar facts can be observed from Figure 3 and Figure 4 . Figure 3 shows ROC curves of IBk (k = 1) and J48 with all term-size on ADFA-LD and ADFA-WD datasets for binary class classification. Figure 4 shows ROC curves of IBk (k = 1) and J48 with term-size 3 on ADFA-LD and ADFA-WD datasets for multiclass classification. From Figure 4(c), Figure 4(d) and Table A4 we can observe that IBk and J48 achieves high accuracy for normal class on ADFA-WD, but fails to distinguish among attack classes. The possible cause for this could be, similarity among system call traces of vulnerabilities exploits launched through metasploit.
Conclusion
In this work, we have evaluated our proposed modified vector space representation using ADFA-LD and ADFA-WD system call trace datasets. We extracted features from both datasets using our proposed method for varying term-size. We also considered binary class and multiclass classification for evaluation on both datasets. Modified vector space representation (term-size 2, 3 and 5) performs as well as standard vector space model (term-size 1) if not better in terms of accuracy, FP rate and F-measure. There is no significant difference in results for varying term-size. However, higher term-size preserves more system call sequence information, which provides resistance against mimicry attacks. From the evaluation results, we conclude that IBk and J48 perform better on both datasets compare with other selected algorithms. 
Appendix: Experiment Results
In this section we provide detailed experiment results on ADFA-LD and ADFA-WD with binary class and multiclass class labels. Results shown here are weighted average results of individual class results. 
